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For Heidrun Brückner, in memory of our joint encounters with Julius Jolly
It was Julius Jolly, founder of the Würzburg chair of Indology and undoubtedly one 
of the most profound scholars in the field of Dharma literature, who remarked in his 
“Kollektaneen zum Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra”:
Der Grad der Ausbildung des Urkunden- und Schriftenwesens ist für die relative 
Chronologie der Smtis sehr wichtig und läßt sich in den jüngeren Smtis, die hier wieder 
mit dem K.A. parallel gehen, stufenweise verfolgen (Jolly 1914: 355 = 2012: 875).
Although Jolly’s conclusions about the date of the Arthaśāstra can no longer be accept- 
ed, he pointed here to an important methodological approach. In my 2002 edition and 
translation of the Lekhapaddhati-Lekhapañcāśikā, an anonymous medieval text on mod- 
els of letter writing and the composition of legal documents from 12th-15th century 
Gujarat, I tried to follow Jolly’s advice by investigating different Dharma texts in order 
to establish different phases of a gradual development as represented in those texts. It 
was my aim to define the place of documents in the wider context of public and civil law 
and their relation to the later authoritative principle of the threefold evidence in juridical 
procedure (trividhapramāṇa) consisting of documents, witnesses and possession.
As I showed there, older texts, including all the preserved Dharmasūtra texts as well 
as the most ancient Dharmaśāstras, are not aware of written documents as legal evi-
dence. According to my analysis, the last phase of this legal procedure without writ-
ten evidence is represented by two texts: the Mānava Dharmaśāstra and the Kauṭilīya 
Arthaśāstra. It was again Jolly who, soon after the discovery and first edition of the 
Arthaśāstra, noticed the close parallels between Dharmaśāstra texts and Kauṭilya’s 
Arthaśāstra (Jolly 1913 = 2012: 817-864). In fact, many passages can be interpreted as 
direct borrowings either from the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra itself or from a closely related 
text of the same genre.1
The reason that I now take up this issue again is that some recently published trans-
lations of the Mānava Dharmaśāstra and the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra seem to contradict 
my former conclusions and therefore demand a reconsideration of the arguments which 
I brought forward in 2002.2
1 The mechanisms and intentions that lay behind this process are aptly described in Vigasin & 
Romanov 1980. 
2 The following discussion is largely based on my study on the development of diplomatics as repre-
sented in ancient Indian law texts (Strauch 2002: 19-52). Since the book appeared in German and 
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At that time I described the situation in the two texts as follows:
Manu may have known writing. However, written documents of any kind did not play any 
role in its juridical system. Contrary to the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra he doesn’t even refer to 
written legal procedure. (…) Out of the later trividhapramāṇas juridical authority is attrib- 
uted only to witnesses and possession. This should not to be taken to mean that private 
documents did not exist, nor that they were not used in practical law at the time when these 
texts were composed. But the codified law as represented here takes no notice of them. (…) 
These two texts represent a state of ancient Indian law in which writing as well as written 
public documents were known. In the sphere of civil law, however, written documents ap-
parently did not play a significant role (Strauch 2002: 34-35).
This brief essay is not the place to address the entire issue. In fact, this is not even neces-
sary. If we look at the relevant passages in both texts, there is apparently only a single 
word that determines the validity of my evaluation: deśa.3 It was recognized quite early 
that there are passages in the Arthaśāstra and in Dharmaśāstra texts where this term 
cannot be translated in its conventional meaning “place, region”, but has to be conceived 
as a specific legal term. I therefore want to use this article to summarize what we know 
about this word in the context of early legal terminology and to determine whether this 
knowledge really helps us to settle the question about written documents in civil law and 
legal procedure.
1. Manu and Kauṭilya : Śāstric intertextuality
In the Mānava Dharmaśāstra deśa occurs only in the following passage:
apahnave ‘dhamarṇasya dehīty uktasya saṃsadi /
abhiyoktā diśed deśaṃ karaṇaṃ vānyad uddiśet // 8.52
adeśaṃ yaś ca diśati nirdiśyāpahnute ca yaḥ /
yaś cādharottarān arthān vigītān nāvabudhyate // 8.53
apadiśyāpadeśyaṃ ca punar yas tv apadhāvati /
samyak praṇihitaṃ cārthaṃ pr̥ṣṭaḥ san nābhinandati // 8.54
asaṃbhāṣye sākṣibhiś ca deśe saṃbhāṣate mithaḥ /
nirucyamānaṃ praśnaṃ ca necched yaś cāpi niṣpatet // 8.55
brūhīty uktaś ca na brūyād uktaṃ ca na vibhāvayet /
na ca pūrvāparaṃ vidyāt tasmād arthāt sa hīyate // 8.56
jñātāraḥ santi mety uktvā diśety ukto diśen na yaḥ /
dharmasthaḥ kāraṇair etair hīnaṃ tam iti nirdiśet // 8.57 (ed. Olivelle 2005: 668-669, my 
emphasis)
since at least for many of our colleagues German has ceased to be a language that is commonly 
perceived as a medium of academic communication, I decided to repeat some of my previous ar-
guments and to confront them with Olivelle’s recent interpretations. For making this discussion 
accessible to a wider audience, I use the English language. For the same reason, quotations from my 
work will also be translated into English. I use this opportunity to thank Richard Salomon (Seattle) 
who took the trouble to check the English of this paper. 
3 For a discussion of karaṇa, another potential candidate for the meaning “written document” in the 
Mānava Dharmaśāstra and the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra, see Strauch 2002: 34-34. Following Kangle, 
Olivelle translates karaṇa in KA 3.1.16 as “document” (2013: 180), but he remarks in his notes 
(2013: 584-585) that the “last transaction [karaṇa]” is considered as valid. This latter interpretation 
of karaṇa as “transaction, legal act” is certainly preferable here (Strauch 2002: 32-33).
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In his 2005 translation of Manu, Patrick Olivelle interpreted deśa as “document.” 
Consequently, he translated this passage as:
When the debtor, told in court to pay up, denies the charge, the plaintiff should produce a 
document or offer some other evidence. When the plaintiff produces something that is not 
documentary evidence; produces and disavows it; does not realize that his earlier points 
contradict the points he makes subsequently; states his case and then backs away from it; 
does not acknowledge under questioning a point that has been clearly established; secretly 
discusses with witnesses a document which is prohibited from being discussed; objects to 
a question clearly articulated; retreats; does not speak when he is ordered “Speak!”; does 
not prove what he asserts; and does not understand what goes before and what after – such 
a plaintiff loses his suit. When a plaintiff says “I have people who know,” but when told 
“Produce them” does not produce them, the judge should declare him also the loser for 
these very reasons (2005: 169-170, my emphasis).
This translation was accepted by Axel Michaels and Anand Mishra in their recent 
German translation of the Manu-Smr̥ti (2010: 155 and 353, fn. 52).
In an article published in 2004, Olivelle points to the obvious parallelism of this pas-
sage to KA 3.1.19 and concludes his discussion with the statement:4
The term lekhya for a document produced as evidence, a term that becomes standard in 
later dharma texts, is not found either in the AŚ (= Arthaśāstra, I.S.) or Manu within the 
context of judicial proceedings, even though the AŚ uses the term for other kinds of writ- 
ings. The conclusion then is that deśa was an old term for a document produced in court of 
law, possible related to diś in the sense of pointing out … (Olivelle 2004: 285).
In accordance with this understanding, Olivelle also translates the respective KA pas- 
sage 3.1.19 in his recent translation of this text:
nibaddhaṃ vādam utsṛjyānyaṃ vādaṃ saṃkrāmati, pūrvoktaṃ paścimenārthena 
nābhisaṃdhatte, paravākyam anabhigrāhyam abhigrāhyāvatiṣṭhate, pratijñāya deśaṃ 
nirdiśety ukte na nirdiśati, hīnadeśam adeśaṃ vā nirdiśati, nirdiṣṭād deśād anyaṃ deśam 
upasthāpayati, upasthite deśe ‘rthavacanaṃ naivam ity apavyayate, sākṣibhir avadhṛtaṃ 
necchati, asambhāṣye deśe sākṣibhir mithaḥ sambhāṣate, iti paroktahetavaḥ // (ed. Kangle 
1969: 97)
The man casts aside the plaint as recorded and moves on to another plaint; does not make 
a point made subsequently accord with what was stated previously; after challenging an 
unchallengeable statement of the opponent, remains obstinate; promises to produce a doc- 
ument (deśa), but when told, “Produce it,” does not produce it, or produces a defective doc- 
ument (hīnadeśa) or something that does not constitute a documentary evidence (adeśa); 
puts forward a document (deśa) different from the document (deśa) specified; denies a sig-
nificant statement in the document (deśa) he has put forward, saying “It is not so”; does not 
accept what has been ascertained through witnesses; secretly carries on a discussion with 
witnesses with regard to a document (deśa) that is prohibited from being discussed – these 
are the reasons for loss of suit (Olivelle 2013: 180-181, Skt. terms my addition).
Both passages would thus witness a rather advanced stage of development in the history 
of Indian diplomatics, in which the authority of written documents in legal procedure 
is generally acknowledged. Initially unnoticed by Olivelle – but referred to in his 2013 
4 Olivelle repeats some of his arguments in the introduction of his translation of Manu (2005: 47-49).
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translation of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra (Olivelle 2013: 585-586) – was the quite similar 
attempt by Samozvancev who already in 1978 wrote a long article in which he tried to 
show that deśa in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra means “document”.5
Although their individual arguments differ,6 both scholars share the same conviction: 
Since documents are not referred to in either of these two texts in the context of legal 
procedures by their conventional terms such as lekha, likhita or lekhya, they must be hid-
den under an obscure terminology which has to be uncovered by the diligent philologist. 
This conviction is based on the assumption that the theory of the trividhapramāṇa was 
somehow a latent system that underlay the Indian legal procedure from the very begin-
ning of its attestation.
Manu uses the term deśa only in this single passage. Whether and how he understood 
it is difficult to say. The terminology of this passage is strange in comparison with the 
rest of the text, and its commentators – as well as modern translators – have clearly had 
problems in interpreting it.
If we look at the commentators, none of them understood deśa or its combinations as 
“document”; evidently, the meaning of this term was less than clear to them. Nonetheless, 
they hesitated to introduce into this context a well-known institution that was otherwise 
lacking in Manu’s exposition of a legal procedure. As shown by Olivelle (2004: 283-
284), they either replaced the somewhat obscure deśa by deśya and interpreted the latter 
as “witness who was present/at the spot”, or they understood deśa in its common sense 
as “place”,7 indicating that the plaintiff would have to indicate the transaction’s location. 
Bhāruci (ca. 8th c. CE), who was the earliest commentator on Manu and who was well 
acquainted with the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra or a closely related Artha text (Derrett 1965, 
Trautmann 1971: 132-168), knows both readings. The term deśa he perceives as a state-
ment that has to include the place and time of the acquisition, as well as the witnesses’ 
testimony to prove it. The variant reading deśya he explains as deṣṭavyaṃ yathā gr̥hītaṃ 
kathayet “to be indicated: he should tell how it was obtained”. Only for karaṇa in Manu’s 
text – a term that was used in later Dharmaśāstras and in medieval times to designate 
a kind of written document – does Bhāruci consider a link to written documents (ed. 
Derrett 1975,1: 96-97; tr. Derrett 1975,2: 109-110). He clearly states that deśa has to be 
regarded here as the more general term that also comprises karaṇa: “And so even the 
word ‘place’ (deśa) is intended to imply the ‘proof’ (karaṇa)” (tr. Derrett 1975,2: 109).8 
In none of his explanations does he confine the meaning of deśa to “document”. Olivelle 
5 Samozvancev repeated his arguments in several articles (1981, 1984), some of them also published 
in English (1980/81, 1982/83).
6 For a detailed criticism of Samozvancev’s arguments see my discussion of deśa in Strauch 2002: 
24-30.
7 According to Olivelle (2004: 284), the connotation “place” was chosen by Bhāruci, Sarvajña-
Nārāyaṇa and Nandana. Medhātithi, Govindarāja, Kullūka, Rāghavānanda, Rāmacandra and 
Maṇirāma understood deśa/deśya as “witness”. Modern translations of this passage normally use 
one of these options. Cf. e. g. Bühler 1886: 263: “(a witness) who was present” for deśyaṃ in 8.52, “a 
witness not present at the transaction” for adeśaṃ in 8.53 and “in a place” for deśe in 8.55. Burnell 
consistently renders deśa as “place” for: “point out the place (where the debt was contracted)” 
(8:52), “an impossible place” (8:53) and “in a place” (8.55) (Burnell 1884: 185-186).
8 Bhāruci’s interpretation is based on his reading karaṇaṃ vā samuddiśet that is also found in a num-
ber of manuscripts. Part of the difficulty in translating this verse is due to the different renderings 
of this pāda and the ambiguous relationship of the terms deśa and karaṇa. 
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attributes this inconsistency to Bhāruci’s ignorance of the “precise meaning of technical 
terms such as deśa for a legal document” (2013: 52).
It is obvious that none of these explanations and translations is completely satisfacto-
ry. This situation is completely understandable when we consider this passage as a rather 
uncritical incorporation of textual material from another tradition. Therefore Olivelle is 
doubtlessly right in pointing to the necessity of interpreting this term on the basis of its 
use in the Arthaśāstra, from which this passage was obviously imported and where we 
should expect a more consistent use of terminology. For this purpose it is necessary to 
go beyond the limited evidence of the single passage (KA 3.1.19) quoted above and to 
expand the scope of our investigation at least to the juridical chapters of the Kauṭilīya 
Arthaśāstra (adhikaraṇas 3 and 4) in their entirety. There we find many more occur-
rences of the term deśa which might help to reveal its terminological meaning in the 
Arthaśāstra.
2. Deśa and the right of ownership in the Arthaśāstra
Meyer in his admirable German translation of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra already recog-
nized that it is not possible to translate deśa consistently in the 3rd and 4th adhikaraṇa, 
and proposed the meanings “Entscheidungspunkt, Beweisstück, Beweismittel” (1926: 
957).9 Similarly, R.P. Kangle suggested “evidence, proof” (1969, 1: 313), although he also 
considered a possible secondary “proof of ownership, title”. As I have shown (Strauch 
2002: 25-26), this latter rather specific interpretation is contradictory and should be 
given up in favour of the more generic “evidence, proof”. However, both passages where 
deśa has to be understood, according to Kangle, in this more specific sense of “proof of 
ownership, title” form a suitable starting point for our discussion. They are part of the 
exposition the right of ownership and have to be placed against this background.
The first of these passages (3.16.29) runs as follows:
svasvāmisambandhas tu - bhogānuvr̥ttir ucchinnadeśānāṃ yathāsvaṃ dravyāṇām (ed. 
Kangle 1969, my emphasis)
Fortlaufender Besitz gilt für Sachen, bei denen die Beweispunkte weggefallen sind, als 
gleichwertig dem Eigentumsrecht (Meyer 1926: 300, my emphasis).10
In accordance with his understanding of deśa Olivelle (2013: 215, my emphasis) 
translates:
With reference to the relation between owner and his property, however – for assets to 
which the documentary evidence has been lost, their continuous enjoyment establishes 
the respective ownership.
The second passage that concerns us here is found in the fourth adhikaraṇa (KA 4.6.9):
9 Cf. also Jolly, who translated hīnadeśam adeśaṃ vā nirdiśati in KA 3.1.19 as “er gibt den Streitpunkt 
zu niedrig oder falsch an” (1917: 232 = 2012: 925).
10 Unfortunately, this passage is left untranslated by Kangle (1972). Cf. also the Russian translation 
by A.A. Vigasin: “esli (drugie) dokazatel’stva utračeny” (“if [other] pieces of evidence are lost”) 
(Vigasin & Samozvancev 1984: 82). Kal’yanov’s translation (1993: 207) “dlja lic pokinuvšix dannoe 
mesto” (“for persons who had left the respective place”) is completely off the point.
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nāṣṭikaś cet tad eva pratisaṃdadhyāt, yasya pūrvo dīrghaś ca paribhogaḥ śucir vā deśas 
tasya dravyam iti vidyāt (ed. Kangle 1969: 137, my emphasis)
If the person who lost the article were also to prove the same, he shall hold the article as be-
longing to him whose possession of it was earlier and long or whose title is clear (Kangle 
1972: 270, my emphasis).
Wenn es sich um einen handelt, der etwas verloren hat, soll er ebendasselbe nachweisen. 
Wer vorher und lange fort im Besitz (des betreffenden Gegenstandes) gewesen ist oder wes-
sen Angabe makellos ist,11 dem gehört der Gegenstand. So soll er (der Richter) es ansehen 
(Meyer 1926 : 335-336, my emphasis).
Although in his Russian translation of the Arthaśāstra Kal’yanov is not really consistent 
in the rendering of deśa, he gives here: “čestnye svidetel’skie pokazanija”, “honest testi-
mony of witnesses” (Kal’yanov 1993: 236).
Again Olivelle’s translation has a different interpretation of deśa:
If the person who lost the article were to establish the same, he should recognize that the 
article belongs to the person who possessed it first and longer, or who has a valid document 
of title (Olivelle 2005: 235-236, my emphasis).
But is such a rather specific understanding of deśa really possible in these two cases?
Both Kangle’s “title” and Olivelle’s “document of title” show that they consider deśa 
to be associated with the concept of the “title of ownership”. Both passages deal with 
different aspects of the law of ownership. In ancient Indian law, legal ownership is es-
tablished by a title. The Sanskrit term used here is āgama, and makes clear that the legal 
appropriation of an object (by donation, inheritance, purchase) presupposes legal own-
ership. It is a general opinion in Dharmaśāstras that possession without a title (āgama) 
cannot establish legal ownership. However, in cases where the title cannot be proven by 
evidence, although the object was legally acquired (even if that cannot be proven any-
more), uninterrupted possession can result in legal ownership.
This is obviously this situation addressed by the first of these two passages, KA 
3.16.29, introducing a chapter that describes the conditions under which the uninterrupt-
ed possession of an object can result in a title of ownership (usucaption). Accordingly, 
ucchinnadeśa describes a situation when the proof (of a title) can no longer be procured. 
If we were to translate deśa here as “documentary evidence”, this would clearly rule 
out any other kind of evidence that could be procured by the original owner to prove 
his case. The understanding of this expression therefore has to rely on the Arthaśāstra’s 
definition of the title and the ways in which it can be proven.
This leads us directly to the second passage quoted above. Here the text addresses an-
other type of unclear ownership and describes the procedure in the case of lost property. 
In explaining how the owner can prove his legal title on the object in question, the text 
says (KA 4.6.7-4.6.10):
tac cen niveditam āsādyeta, rūpābhigṛhītam āgamaṃ pṛcchet “kutas te labdham” iti. sa cet 
brūyāt “dāyādyād avāptam, amuṣmāl labdhaṃ krītaṃ kāritam ādhipracchannam, ayam 
11 Meyer is not sure about the exact reading (vādeśas or vā deśas) and remarks (fn. 11): “Ist ādeça 
Ausweis, Indizien, Leumund? Oder soll man mit dem Text vā deças trennen: ‘bei wem der Ort 
koscher ist’, d. h. bei wem man solch einen Gegenstand erwarten darf?”
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asya deśaḥ kālaś copasamprāpteḥ, ayam asyārghaḥ pramāṇaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ mūlyaṃ ca” 
iti, tasyāgamasamādhau mucyeta // nāṣṭikaś cet tad eva pratisaṃdadhyāt, yasya pūrvo 
dīrghaś ca paribhogaḥ śucir vā deśas tasya dravyam iti vidyāt // catuṣpadadvipadānām 
api hi rūpaliṅgasāmānyaṃ bhavati, kim aṅga punar ekayonidravyakartṛprasūtānāṃ 
kupyābharaṇabhāṇḍānām iti (ed. Kangle 1969: 168, my emphasis).
If he comes across the reported article he should ask the man arrested with the article 
about his legal title to it, saying, “Where did you get this?” If he were to say, “I obtained it 
through inheritance. I received it – bought it, got it made, received it secretly as a pledge 
– from that individual. This is the place and the time of its acquisition. These are its price, 
size, distinguishing marks, and value,” he should be released when his legal title to it has 
been substantiated. If the person who lost the article were to establish the same, he should 
recognize that the article belongs to the person who possessed it first and longer, or who has 
a valid document of title; for even among quadrupeds and bipeds, there is a similarity in 
appearance and distinguishing marks – how much more among forest produce, ornaments, 
and wares produced with material from the same source and by the same manufacturer 
(Olivelle 2005: 235-236, my emphasis).
The passage makes it clear that the title (āgama) depends, first, on the plausible indi-
cation of the mode of appropriation, and second, on the correct statements about the 
specific features of the object in question. If both parties give this information, the deci-
sion is then to be made on the basis either of the criteria of possession (paribhoga) or of 
suci deśa. In my opinion, suci deśa can here only be interpreted in the sense of “clear 
evidence,” including the testimony of witnesses who were able to confirm the statements 
made above, and any other indications that support the statements made by both parties. 
The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra’s following reference to the problems of identifying an object 
as someone’s property could indicate that here deśa has to be understood in a more gen-
eral sense, i. e. as referring to statements that clearly prove the ownership of one person 
by indicating specific and distinct features of this object. Such an interpretation is also 
favoured by Manu’s rendering of the same situation (8.31-32):12
mamedam iti yo brūyāt so ‘nuyukto yathāvidhi /
saṃvādya rūpasaṃkhyādīn svāmī tad dravyam arhati // 8.31
avedayan pranaṣṭasya deśaṃ kālaṃ ca tattvataḥ /
varṇaṃ rūpaṃ pramāṇaṃ ca tatsamaṃ daṇḍam arhati // 8.32 (ed. Olivelle 2005: 664)
A man who claims “This is mine” and, when questioned according to the rule, identifies 
its physical appearances, number, and the like correctly, is the owner and deserves to have 
that property; but if he is ignorant of the exact place and time when it was lost and its color, 
physical appearance, and size, he deserves a fine equal in value to that property (tr. Olivelle 
2005: 168).
As we have seen, in both cases it is rather difficult to limit the semantic scope of deśa 
to “document” without neglecting the context of the legal system. These difficulties are 
also obvious if we consult a third passage of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra that describes a 
very similar case within the sphere of the right of ownership. The topic of this passage 
is asvāmivikraya “unauthorized sale”, one of the traditional eighteen vyavahārapadas 
“titles of law.”
12 Cf. also Yājñ. 2.35.
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As in the passage quoted above, the legal title of ownership has to be proven by an 
indication of the legal acquisition. The question is again: kutas te labdham “From where 
did you get it?” and thus refers directly to the legal title (āgama). The present holder 
of the object is then asked to indicate the circumstances of the sale, and in particular 
the seller of the object. There is no mention of a written document in this procedure. 
If in Kauṭilya’s legal system a document would be required to prove the title, it should 
have been mentioned here. Instead, the text uses the term karaṇa “proof”. It says (KA 
3.16.17-18):
nāṣṭikaś ca svakaraṇaṃ kr̥tvā naṣṭapratyāhṛtaṃ labheta. svakaraṇābhāve pañcabandho 
daṇḍaḥ (ed. Kangle 1969: 122, my emphasis).
The one who lost the article, furthermore, should receive the lost article that was recovered 
by showing proof of ownership. If there is no proof of ownership the fine is one-fifth of 
the amount (tr. Olivelle 2013: 214, my emphasis).
If we compare this phrase with the passages discussed above, it is obvious that the rather 
generic svakaraṇaṃ kr̥tvā corresponds to the phrase yasya pūrvo dīrghaś ca paribhogaḥ 
śucir vā deśas. The equation of both passages completely matches with the legal princi-
ple according to which either uninterrupted possession or clear evidence (for ownership) 
establish the right of ownership.
3. Back to intertextuality: the Arthaśāstra and Dharmaśāstric strategies of 
interpretation
The Yājñavalkya-Smr̥ti’s treatment of the vyavahārapada “asvāmivikraya” seems to be 
largely indebted to the Arthaśāstra or to a closely related text (cf. Jolly 1913: 74 = 2012: 
882). Yājñavalkya renders the passage in question as:
āgamenopabhogena naṣṭaṃ bhāvyam ato ‘nyathā /
pañcabandho damas tasya rājñe tenāvibhāvite // 2.171
The (ownership of something that has been) lost is to be proven by title (and) possession, 
not otherwise. If he cannot prove it to the king, his fine is one-fifth.
Yājñavalkya-Smr̥ti here paraphrases the generic svakaraṇaṃ kr̥tvā of the Arthaśāstra 
passage by the more specific explanation that the right of ownership is based on two prin-
ciples: title based on legal acquisition (āgama) and possession of the object (upabhoga).
This is not exactly the same as what is expressed in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra passage 
discussed above (KA 4.6.9), where possession and suci deśa were regarded as alterna-
tive conditions for ownership. It is therefore not possible to equate āgama and deśa 
– as Samozvancev did – since according to Indian law, possession without a legal title 
(whether proven or not) can never constitute ownership; and conversely, a title without 
possession can in certain circumstances result in the loss of the object and the right of 
ownership. In the same way, it is not possible to render āgama here as “document”. With 
regard to this parallel, already Meyer observed:
Man mag āgama hier mit Rechtstitel übersetzen, darf aber, wie aus dem folgenden erhellt, 
nicht etwa eine schriftliche Urkunde darunter verstehen, sondern nur den Rechtsanspruch, 
genauer: den rechtlichen Erwerb, öffentlich und vor Zeugen (1927: 102).
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Therefore the relation between deśa and āgama as revealed by the comparison of these 
passages can be explained as follows: Deśa signifies evidence that can prove or disprove 
the validity of a legal title, 13 whereas āgama signifies the title itself, characterized by the 
legal acquisition of the object. In case the title cannot be proven (but also not disproven) 
(= ucchinnadeśa, KA 3.16.29), possession alone can constitute ownership.
Such an interpretation of deśa can be easily employed for other occurrences of this 
term in the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra. And it seems also to be involved in Manu’s rendering 
of the Arthaśāstra passage that contains this obscure term. A more careful reading of 
both parallel texts (Kauṭilīya and Manu) might give a hint on what Manu perceived as 
deśa. In the beginning of the passage he simply takes over the Arthaśāstra’s text with 
deśa. But in the concluding part he seems to give a more specific explanation, when he 
says:
brūhīty uktaś ca na brūyād uktaṃ ca na vibhāvayet /
na ca pūrvāparaṃ vidyāt tasmād arthāt sa hīyate // 8.56
jñātāraḥ santi mety uktvā diśety ukto diśen na yaḥ /
dharmasthaḥ kāraṇair etair hīnaṃ tam iti nirdiśet // 8.57
[If he] does not speak when he is ordered “Speak!”; does not prove what he asserts; and 
does not understand what goes before and what after – such a plaintiff loses his suit. When 
a plaintiff says “I have people who know,” but when told “Produce them” does not produce 
them, the judge should declare him also the loser for these very reasons (tr. Olivelle 2005: 
169-170).
These two sentences can be read as a paraphrase of the dictum in KA 3.1.19:
pratijñāya deśaṃ nirdiśety ukte na nirdiśati
He who promised evidence but when told “Produce it!” does not produce it …
According to this parallel, deśa comprises the plaintiff’s own testimony and the testimo-
ny of persons who are acquainted with the case ( jñātāraḥ)14, i. e. witnesses.
Manu is not the only Dharmaśāstra that contains verses that are obviously shaped 
on the basis of the Arthaśāstra text in question. These texts reveal different strategies 
of appropriation. While Manu preserved the original text and added an explanatory 
paraphrase, others replaced deśa by a more comprehensible term and thereby adapted 
the passage to their own terminology. Such a case is clearly represented by the verse 
preserved in the Mātkā 2 of the Nārada-Smr̥ti, a section which is only preserved in 
a part of the manuscript traditions, but which was also known to Asahāya, the earliest 
extant commentator on the Nārada-Smr̥ti (cf. Lariviere 1989,2: 229). The verse is found 
in a passage that describes the general features of a lost case.
abhiyukto ‘bhiyogasya yadi kuryād apahnavam /
abhiyoktā diśed deśyaṃ pratyavaskandito na cet // Nār. Mātkā 2.26
If the accused denies the charge, the accuser has to prove the case, except when the accused 
demurs (tr. Lariviere 1989,2: 234).
13 This was also the understanding of Viśvarūpa who comments on Yajñ. 2.175 lekhyādinā, indicating 
that the principal types of evidence have to be understood here.
14 Certain recensions replace jñātāraḥ by sākṣiṇaḥ “witnesses”.
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This verse replaces the obscure deśa by the more readily comprehensible adjective deśya 
“to be indicated”.15 Again the generic meaning “evidence, proof” is inevitable here as 
the term must include different types of evidence that were acknowledged in the legal 
procedure. Accordingly, the commentator Asahāya completely correctly paraphrases 
diśed deśyaṃ by kriyām ānayed “he should procure a proof.”
The same understanding underlies the rendering of this verse by Br̥haspati-Smr̥ti 
1.2.21:
apadiśyābhiyogaṃ yas tam atītyāparaṃ vadet /
kriyām uktvānyathā brūyāt sa vādī hānim āpnuyāt //
If a plaintiff makes a charge and, disregarding it, says something else,
(or if) after declaring the evidence he then contradicts it, he would lose the case.
Bhaspati’s variant clearly corresponds to the Arthaśāstra’s nirdiṣṭād deśād anyaṃ 
deśam upasthāpayati (KA 3.1.19). Like Asahāya’s commentary on Nār. Mātkā 2.26, this 
verse replaces deśa by kriyā thus using a more common and established Dharmaśāstric 
term.
The same Arthaśāstra phrase was probably also the basis for the verses Yājñ. 2.13 and 
Nār. (vya.) 1.175 that occur in a closely related context, namely the physical signs of a 
false witness. But instead of replacing the obscure term deśa by a commonly understood 
equivalent, they reinterpreted the sense of the passage according to the habitual meaning 
of deśa as “place,” thus representing a third method of appropriation:
deśād deśāntaraṃ yāti sr̥kkiṇī parileḍhi ca /
lalāṭaṃ svidyate cāsya mukhaṃ vaivarṇyam eti ca // Yajñ. 2.13
He moves from one place to another and he licks the corners of (his) mouth,
and his forehead is sweating and his face loses its colour.
yas tv ātmadoṣabhinnatvād asvastha iva lakṣyate /
sthānāt sthānāntaraṃ gacched ekaikaṃ copadhāvati // Nār. 1.175
But he who betrays himself by his own faults, i.e., if he acts as if he were sick, if he moves 
from one place to another and looks to this one and that one for assistance (after Lariviere 
1989, 2: 85).
Although these three examples reveal different strategies of intertextuality – uncritical 
borrowing with additional explanations, substitution of obscure terms, and reinterpreta-
tion – none of them indicates for deśa the meaning “document”.
Summary
In the present paper, the semantic scope of deśa has been approached from two different 
perspectives: the right of ownership in legal procedure as described in the Kauṭilīya 
Arthaśāstra and the secondary interpretations as found in the Dharmaśāstra parallels. 
The internal evidence of the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra as well as the related passages in 
several Dharmaśāstric texts cannot support the interpretation “document” for the legal 
15 As Lariviere points out, the second half of the verse that contains the term deśya is not quoted by 
any other commentator (1989,2: 234).
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term deśa used in the  Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra and in Manu 8.52-57. Rather, deśa regular-
ly occurs in a context where we expect a rather general meaning “(point of) evidence, 
proof.”
Moreover, the term deśa is nowhere mentioned where we should defi nitely expect 
it if it were really designating a written document. Nor is any other term for “docu-
ment” used in these passages: the chapters on vyavahāra in Manu and the  Kauṭilīya 
Arthaśāstra do not contain any systematic treatment of documents as authoritative evi-
dence, and documents are not even mentioned among the types of evidence used in 
the juridical procedure. Instead, both texts devote long passages on witnesses and their 
function in a process.16
In order to reliably establish the semantic scope of the term deśa , it is therefore nec-
essary to take into account the overall legal system as represented in the  Kauṭilīya 
Arthaśāstra. Narrowing down the meaning of deśa to “document” would raise several 
problems with regard to the integrity of the Arthaśāstra text and its legal system. These 
problems can be easily avoided by adopting the meaning “(point of) evidence, proof”.
Such a general understanding is also the basis of the diff erent renderings of deśa and 
of passages in later Dharmaśāstra texts, such as the  Nārada-Smr̥ti, the  Yājñavalkya-
Smr̥ti and the  Br̥haspati-Smr̥ti, that probably originally contained this word. Although 
these texts are quite aware of the  trividhapramāṇa principle and include long passages 
about written documents as legal authority in the juridical procedure, none of them sub-
stitutes or interprets deśa as “document.”
Based on the evidence discussed here, the position of deśa with regard to the right of 
ownership as presented by these early texts can be represented as follows:
16 Manu 8: 61-108, KA 3.11.26-50.
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Once the meaning “(point of) evidence, proof, indicium” is established, it is of course 
possible to replace this general term by more specific kinds of evidence. Hence a trans-
lation that substitutes “witness” – as some of Manu’s commentators did – is not con-
tradictory, if done in an isolated passage; and in the same way, translating this term as 
“document” does not really spoil the text. The same attitude can be observed in the case 
of the related generic term karaṇa, which some of Manu’s commentators paraphrased by 
lekhyādi “documents, etc.” (cf. Strauch 2002: 33-34). However, given the overall context 
of the legal procedure as described by the Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra and by Manu, such a 
translation seems to produce serious conflicts within the entire text.
Before revising our ideas about the development of Indian diplomatics and the role 
of written documents in the legal procedure of ancient India, it seems therefore advis-
able to look for further, more convincing evidence that could justify an interpretation of 
deśa as “document. For the time being, I suggest a return to the more cautious and more 
plausible explanation brought forward by Meyer, Kangle and Vigasin: deśa is one of the 
terms designating “(point of) evidence, proof” – a meaning that can be easily explained 
on etymological grounds (diś “indicate, show”), and can even be connected with the 
etymologically related Latin term indicium, used in legal terminology in the meaning 
“evidence”.
Abbreviations
Br̥h. Bhaspati-Smti (ed. Aiyangar 1941)
KA  Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra (ed. Kangle 1969)
Manu Manu-Smti / Mānava-Dharmaśāstra (ed. Olivelle 2005)
Nār. Nārada-Smti (ed. Lariviere 1989,1)
Yājñ. Yājñavalkya-Smti (ed. Ganapati Sastri 1921-22)
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